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THREE STEPS FORWARD: 
SHARED REGULATORY SPACE, DEFERENCE, 
AND THE ROLE OF THE COURT 
Amanda Shami* 
 
When a party files suit challenging the legitimacy of an agency’s 
interpretation of its governing statute, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. instructs courts to defer to the agency’s 
interpretation where (1) the court has found that Congress had not 
foreclosed the agency’s interpretation, and (2) the agency’s interpretation 
was a reasonable or permissible exercise of its authority.  However, 
sometimes Congress enacts statutes delegating authority over a given 
regulatory space to more than one agency.  When two agencies have shared 
authority under the same regulatory scheme, those agencies may disagree 
regarding the interpretation of certain provisions that the agencies 
administer.  This forces courts to consider the applicability of Chevron: To 
which agency does the court owe deference?  All of the agencies?  Only 
one?  Does the court owe deference at all? 
Some courts refuse to award any deference where multiple agencies 
administer a statute.  Other courts do not view deference as precluded, and 
they instead consider the reasonableness of the interpretations in awarding 
the less substantial Skidmore deference.  The courts’ differing treatments 
are a subsidiary problem to a more fundamental issue:  Why should the fact 
that multiple agencies administer a statute affect the award of deference if 
the interpretation is a reasonable exercise of authority? 
This Note argues that courts should rely on the policies, considerations, 
and canons of construction that gave way to and underlie the principles of 
deference in determining to which agency the court should defer.  The Note 
offers a six-factor balancing test for courts to use in making this 
assessment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider a piece of legislation aimed at ensuring the safety of 
bioengineered food.  Assume Congress has delegated concurrent authority 
to promulgate regulations with the force of law to both the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), which regulates the food safety standards for almost 
all food products, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which 
regulates the food safety standards related to meat, poultry, and processed 
egg products.  The statute delegates to both agencies authority over the 
same regulatory space:  the safety of the use of bioengineered food in 
breeding cattle. 
Further assume that each agency construes the statute differently so that 
each interprets “safety” as it understands the term under its own regulations, 
and the FDA’s regulations are more stringent.  These interpretations 
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directly conflict, and both agencies advocate on behalf of their 
interpretation.  Assume for the moment that the FDA’s standards were 
promulgated without reference to any scientific study, but that the USDA’s 
standards were the product of thorough and rigorous scientific study.  And 
assume that the USDA had been responsible for this particular regulatory 
space since 1906 and that the FDA received its current authority in 1958.  
How would a court confronting this situation resolve the conflict?  
Typically, courts will defer to agency interpretations of statutes under 
which the agency has regulatory control.  But here, if both interpretations 
meet the standards for receiving that deference, the court can only defer to 
one agency; so how will it decide? 
This problem occurs when Congress delegates shared regulatory 
authority to multiple agencies in the same policy space.1  When Congress 
delegates power and authority to only one agency to promulgate regulations 
having the force of law, the agency deference issue is typically 
straightforward.2  Where a party challenges either an agency’s statutory 
interpretation or its regulation, the Chevron doctrine instructs courts to 
defer to most agency judgments where the court has found that 
(1) Congress has not explicitly foreclosed the agency’s decision, and (2) the 
agency’s interpretation was reasonable or permissible.3  But when multiple 
agencies have authority over a given statute, to whom does the court owe 
deference on issues of statutory interpretation?4  All of the agencies?  Only 
one?  Is deference precluded entirely?5 
While it is unusual for agencies to directly oppose each other in court, it 
is not exactly rare.6  “[A]gencies do not generally sue each other in court,”7 
 
 1. See generally Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared 
Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012); Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and 
Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201; Jason Marisam, 
Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (2011); Michael Doran, Legislative 
Organization and Administrative Redundancy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1815 (2011); Daniel 
Lovejoy, Note, The Ambiguous Basis for Chevron Deference:  Multiple-Agency Statutes, 88 
VA. L. REV. 879 (2002). 
 2. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); Eric A. Posner & 
Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1726–27 
(2002). 
 3. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 
(1984). 
 4. Chao v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 540 F.3d 519, 525 (6th Cir. 
2008) (“Left undecided by [the Supreme Court], however, is to whom does a reviewing court 
defer when the [two agencies] offer conflicting interpretations of a provision of the Act.”). 
 5. See Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Delegating to Enemies, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2193, 2234–35 (2012). 
 6. See generally Joseph W. Mead, Interagency Litigation and Article III, 47 GA. L. 
REV. 1217 (2013). 
 7. Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do:  How to Deal with the Dysfunction of Multiple-
Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 52 (2009); see also Neal Devins, Unitariness 
and Independence:  Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 
CALIF. L. REV. 255 (1994) (describing the role of the Solicitor General in overseeing 
government litigation and resolving interagency conflicts).  Furthermore, the executive 
branch has developed several avenues to resolve disputes between agencies internally.  One 
example is Executive Order 12,866, which outlines a process for resolving disagreements 
among agency heads. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 7, 3 C.F.R. 638, 648 (1994), reprinted as 
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though they sometimes find themselves on either side of the court aisle 
because of statutory split-enforcement arrangements or adjudicatory 
relationships.8  More often, conflicting agency views exist beneath the 
surface and only become apparent when the action of another agency is 
challenged.9 
This Note focuses on these instances of inconsistency and disagreement 
between agencies tasked with overlapping regulatory authority.  Part I 
discusses the evolution of judicial review of agency interpretations 
beginning with Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,10 and reviewing the impact and 
implications of the Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.11  Part I also explains the several ways by 
which Congress creates overlapping regulatory authority.  Part II 
summarizes some considerations regarding issues of shared jurisdiction that 
courts have confronted and analyzes the current interagency deference 
conflict, exploring several cases in depth.  Finally, Part III applies this 
discourse and proposes a solution to the interagency deference conflict:  the 
addition of a Chevron Step Three to assist courts in determining which 
agency is entitled to deference. 
I.   TWO STEPS BACK:  BACKGROUND ON DEFERENCE 
AND SHARED REGULATORY SPACE 
This part surveys the current landscape with respect to agency deference 
and shared regulatory space.  Part I.A summarizes the topic of agencies and 
agency deference generally.  It includes a brief description of the history of 
judicial review of agency determinations, the history of agency deference, 
and a discussion of Skidmore, Chevron, and United States v. Mead Corp.12 
as the articulations of the modern analytical framework for resolving 
deference cases.  Part I.A concludes with a survey of the policy implications 
and considerations that underlie the deference framework. 
Part I.B presents the different ways through which shared agency 
jurisdiction can come to exist.  Part I.B first presents a theoretical 
framework to understand the ways Congress creates shared agency 
 
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 108, 111 (Supp. IV 2010); see also Tex. State Comm’n 
for the Blind v. United States, 796 F.2d 400, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (reviewing a conflict 
between the Department of Education and the Department of Defense regarding 
interpretations of a statute and noting that Executive Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. § 409.411 
(1980), required the Department of Education to refer the matter for resolution to the 
Department of Justice, which advised that it resolved the conflict in favor of the Department 
of Defense). 
 8. See, e.g., Hinson v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 57 F.3d 1144, 1151–52 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (adjudicating a Federal Aviation Administration petition for review regarding a 
National Transportation Safety Board order). 
 9. See, e.g., Gulf Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 452 F.3d 362, 367 (5th 
Cir. 2006) (considering an agency action where the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, an administration of the Department of Commerce, disagreed with the 
Department of Transportation’s action). 
 10. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 11. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 12. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
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jurisdiction and then provides concrete examples illustrating the types of 
shared space that exist.  These include (1) the creation of shared regulatory 
space through a single statute, (2) the piecemeal creation of shared 
regulatory space through multiple statutes, and (3) the creation of potential 
shared regulatory space through ambiguous statutes. 
A.   Federal Agencies and Agency Deference 
This section presents the basic history and principles of judicial 
deference that inform the discussions that follow on the problem of 
interagency conflict in shared regulatory space. 
1.   Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations 
and Deference Before Chevron 
Even before Skidmore or Chevron, the U.S. Supreme Court instructed 
reviewing courts to uphold regulations adopted by agencies pursuant to a 
specific grant of legislative power unless the promulgating agency exceeded 
the scope of its statutory authority.13  This deference principle was not 
limited to agency rulemaking, but also extended to an agency’s exercise of 
its formal adjudicatory authority.14  From the New Deal era through the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Chevron, the Court’s 1944 opinion in Skidmore 
was the primary source for guidance on judicial review of administrative 
interpretations and agency deference.15 
In Skidmore, seven employees sued their employer for violations of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in federal district court, seeking to 
recover overtime pay for periods of time where they were on-call for the 
employer, but not required to perform any specific tasks except to answer 
fire alarms.16  In construing the language of the FLSA, the district court 
found that the hours employees spent on-call did not constitute hours 
worked under the FLSA for which overtime compensation would be owed 
to them.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed.17 
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, finding that “the rulings, 
interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under [the FLSA], while 
not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a 
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants 
 
 13. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937) 
(“The regulation having been made by the commission in pursuance of constitutional 
statutory authority, it has the same force as though prescribed in terms by the statute.”); 
AT&T v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 236–37 (1936) (“This court is not at liberty to 
substitute its own discretion for that of administrative officers who have kept within the 
bounds of their administrative powers.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 (1941) (“Where, as here, a 
determination has been left to an administrative body, this delegation will be respected and 
the administrative conclusion left untouched.”). 
 15. See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore 
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 
VA. L. REV. 187, 211 (2006). 
 16. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 135 (1944). 
 17. Id. at 136. 
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may properly resort for guidance.”18  The Court articulated the factors that 
courts should consider in their deference analysis:  “[t]he weight of such a 
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in 
[the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”19 
Put another way, the Skidmore principle is that reviewing courts should 
respectfully consider an interpretation of a statute by an agency or agency 
official to which Congress has vested the primary responsibility in 
administering that statute.20  Where a court is persuaded that the agency’s 
executive, authority-based interpretation should receive total or partial 
recognition in the outcome, that court should defer to that agency.21  
Skidmore provided courts with a balancing standard for cases involving 
agency deference that remained the primary guidance until Chevron.22 
2.   Chevron and Its Impact 
In Chevron,23 the Supreme Court considered a challenge to an 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation promulgated under the 
Clean Air Act.24  The case involved permit programs in states that had not 
met federal ambient air quality requirements (the “nonattainment” states).25  
The EPA regulations required nonattainment states to establish a permit 
program for “new or modified major stationary sources” of air pollution26 
and precluded the issuance of permits to a new or modified source unless it 
met those requirements.27 
Before the 1980s, the EPA had treated any pollution-emitting device in a 
plant as a “source.”28  In 1981, the EPA decided that it would no longer 
require a plant to apply for a permit if the modification of an existing device 
or the installation of a new device did not increase the plant’s total 
emissions.29  This new interpretation departed from the old understanding 
that a “source” was each pollution-emitting device, replacing that 
interpretation with a broader definition of “source” that included the whole 
plant.30  This plant-wide definition of source would enable a company to 
add or modify pollution-emitting devices as long as it reduced emissions 
 
 18. Id. at 140. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. John H. Reese, Bursting the Chevron Bubble:  Clarifying the Scope of Judicial 
Review in Troubled Times, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1103, 1117 (2004). 
 22. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 15, at 1247. 
 23. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7642 (1982). 
 25. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839–40. 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6). 
 27. Id. § 7503. 
 28. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1982), 
rev’d sub nom. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 29. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 857–59. 
 30. Id. at 840. 
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from another part of the same plant to result in no net increase in 
emissions.31 
The question before the Court in Chevron was whether the plantwide 
definition of “source” violated the Clean Air Act.32  Before reaching the 
Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit held that it did.33  For the circuit court, the 
purpose of the nonattainment program was to bring about state compliance 
with federal air quality requirements in those states where compliance was 
lagging, and the plantwide definition of source was inconsistent with that 
overriding goal.34  The court was unable to point to a particular provision 
that barred the EPA’s plantwide definition, but it said that the EPA’s 
definition was inconsistent with the general purposes of the nonattainment 
program.35 
The Supreme Court rejected the D.C. Circuit’s rationale.36  The Court 
found that nothing in the statute or its legislative history spoke to the issue 
of whether the plant or each pollution-emitting device within it amounted to 
a “source.”37  The Court further found that the general objectives of the 
nonattainment program, embodying an effort to promote environmental 
quality with minimal restrictions on economic growth, were simply too 
broad to provide such a narrow definition.38 
Because Congress had not directly addressed the exact conflict at issue, 
the question before the Court was whether a permissible construction of the 
statute grounded the agency’s interpretation.39  For the Court, “considerable 
weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a 
statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.”40  In adjudicating the matter, 
the Supreme Court created the now-famous Chevron two-step inquiry:  a 
court first asks whether Congress had explicitly foreclosed the agency’s 
interpretation (Step One), and if the answer is Congress has not, then the 
court asks whether that interpretation was reasonable or permissible (Step 
Two).41  Though seemingly straightforward, the Chevron two-step inquiry 
becomes complex in a variety of cases.42 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d at 726. 
 34. Id. at 727–28. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
 37. Id. at 842, 851. 
 38. Id. at 851, 862. 
 39. Id. at 842. 
 40. Id. at 844. 
 41. Id. at 843–44 (“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an 
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute 
by regulation.  Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are 
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.  Sometimes the legislative 
delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit.  In such a 
case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable 
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.” (citations omitted)). 
 42. For further reading on Chevron, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its 
Aftermath:  Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. 
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Since Chevron, three major justifications have been articulated as support 
for a presumption in favor of deferring to an agency’s interpretation.  The 
first justification is congressional intent—that Congress, in delegating 
authority to agencies, intends for the agencies to be the principal 
interpreters of regulatory statutes.43  The Supreme Court has relied on this 
rationale in subsequent opinions,44 but Justice Scalia and others highlight 
that this intent is a “fictional” construct as means to legitimize their 
deference to the agency.45  The second and third justifications in support of 
agency deference come from the majority holding in Chevron, where the 
Court emphasized the specialized agencies’ relatively greater technical 
expertise and the agencies’ superior political accountability, noting that 
agencies are accountable to the electorate through the President.46  
3.   The Current Analytic Frameworks 
That Guide Agency Deference Analyses 
In 2001, the Supreme Court somewhat clarified the approaches courts 
should use in adjudicating cases of agency deference in United States v. 
Mead Corp.47  Mead involved a U.S. Customs Service’s decision, based on 
its interpretive rules, to classify certain day planners Mead Corporation 
imported as “diaries” rather than as “other items” of a similar sort.48  This 
classification meant that a 4 percent tariff would apply to each day planner 
Mead sought to import into the United States, whereas if the planners 
received the categorization of “other items,” no tariff would apply.49  The 
Court of International Trade affirmed the Government’s classification, but 
the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the Customs Service’s 
classification did not warrant either Chevron deference or any other 
deference scheme.50 
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that while Chevron 
deference was inappropriate there, the interpretive rules could receive 
Skidmore deference.51  The Court held that interpretative rules did not merit 
Chevron deference unless the statute authorizing the agency delegates 
 
REV. 301 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2071 (1990). 
 43. See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 2109. 
 44. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). 
 45. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 511, 517; see also Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and 
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986); Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2642–43 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury:  The Executive’s 
Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2589 (2006). 
 46. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
 47. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 48. Id. at 220–26. 
 49. Id. at 224–25. 
 50. Id. at 225–26. 
 51. Id. at 235. 
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lawmaking power to the agency.52  As applied to Mead, the Court held that 
the Customs Service’s classification rules could not receive Chevron 
deference because they “present a case far removed not only from notice-
and-comment process, but from any other circumstances reasonably 
suggesting that Congress ever thought of classification rulings as deserving 
the deference claimed for them here.”53  The Court continued that the 
agency could raise a claim that the rule deserved Skidmore deference based 
on the ruling’s “thoroughness, logic, and expertness, its fit with prior 
interpretations, and any other sources of weight.”54 
Following the Court’s ruling in Mead, scholars have recognized the 
current scheme for resolving questions regarding agency deference to 
include three distinct analytic approaches.55  In what scholars have termed 
“Step Zero,”56 Mead instructs a reviewing court to first determine whether 
Congress had delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules 
carrying the force of law; if the court determines that Congress has, then the 
court asks whether the agency promulgated the regulation at issue in the 
exercise of that authority.57  These two questions provide courts with a 
threshold inquiry as to which one of the two deference standards, Chevron 
or Skidmore, applies.58  If the court answers either question in the negative, 
then the court applies the Skidmore balancing inquiry, which is the first 
analytic framework.59  If the court answers both questions in the 
affirmative, then the court moves on to the Chevron analysis.60 
Chevron deference, the second analytic framework, is an “all-or-nothing 
proposition,” whereas Skidmore views deference “along a sliding scale” 
where the court assesses the agency’s interpretation against multiple factors 
to determine what weight of deference the agency should receive.61  
Accordingly, courts award “various degrees of deference, ranging from 
none, to slight, to great, depending on the court’s assessment of the strength 
of the agency interpretation under consideration.”62 
However, if a court answers the two Step Zero questions in the 
affirmative, the court then applies the Chevron two-step inquiry.63  Chevron 
Step One asks whether the statute is ambiguous; if the court determines the 
 
 52. See id. at 229 (recognizing “express congressional authorizations to engage in the 
process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings” as meriting of 
Chevron deference). 
 53. Id. at 231. 
 54. Id. at 235. 
 55. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 833 (2001). 
 56. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 55, at 836; Sunstein, supra note 15, at 191. 
 57. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27 (requiring courts to consider whether Congress gave the 
agency in question the authority to bind regulated parties with “the force of law” and, if so, 
whether the agency “exercise[d] . . . that authority”). 
 58. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 15, at 1247. 
 59. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 55, at 873. 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. at 855. 
 62. Id. 
 63. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
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statute is ambiguous, then the court moves to Step Two, which asks 
whether the interpretation is a permissible reading of the statute.64  If the 
court answers either Step One or Step Two in the negative, then the court 
turns to a de novo review of the agency’s interpretation.65 
At the same time, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) instructs 
courts to decide “all relevant questions of law” using de novo review,66 
which is the third analytic approach to considering issues of agency 
interpretation of statutes.  Though courts have had de novo authority over 
statutory interpretation since the APA’s enactment, courts have used their 
discretion to defer to certain agency interpretations rather than use de novo 
review.67  Accordingly, courts have discretion to undertake a de novo 
review or to apply a deference regime to cases involving agency 
interpretations.68  In sum, Mead represents the current regime, which 
includes the Chevron inquiry, the Skidmore balancing test, and de novo 
review.69 
4.   Deference Policy Considerations and Implications 
Some scholars argue that when courts refuse to award deference to 
reasonable agency interpretations of statutes, they undermine the 
longstanding deference doctrine and the general idea that courts should not 
supplant their interpretations for the interpretations of the agency.70 
Scholars have argued that an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a 
statute it administers should prevail over whatever interpretation the court 
presents as an alternative.71  The reasons and values that an agency’s 
interpretation should prevail include (1) democratic theory, policymaking, 
and politics; (2) comparative competence; (3) flexibility; and (4) national 
uniformity.72  First, adopting the agency’s interpretations serves democratic 
 
 64. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984). 
 65. See id. 
 66. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 67. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Policymaking, 44 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 375, 380 (2002) (citing ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, 77th 
CONG., REP. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 90–91 (Comm. 
Print 1941)). 
 68. See ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, 77th CONG., REP. ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 90–91 (Comm. Print 1941) (noting 
that courts may approach questions of statutory interpretation de novo or they may opt to 
determine whether the agency interpretation has substantial support rather than determine 
what the court perceives as the correct interpretation). 
 69. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 15, at 1248. 
 70. See, e.g., Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes:  
An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255 (1988); Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Prodelegation:  Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
81 (1985); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 
283 (1986); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year:  Some Implications of the 
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1093 (1987). 
 71. See, e.g., Byse, supra note 70, at 257; Starr, supra note 70, at 307–08. 
 72. Byse, supra note 70, at 257. 
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theory, policymaking, and politics because this adoption is a “mechanism 
‘for improving the responsiveness of government to the desires of the 
electorate.’”73  The rationale is that delegations of authority to 
administrative agencies allow the electorate to secure a change in policies 
via its election of the President to office; in turn, this promotes democratic 
values and political accountability.74 
Second, comparative competence involves the notion that the agency has 
superior skills as compared to the judiciary because of the expertise the 
agency has honed in managing its responsibilities.75  This competence 
arises from the agency’s technical and professional experts, its day-to-day 
interactions with the industry it regulates, its relationships with the relevant 
congressional committees, its relationships with other government agencies, 
its experience in dealing with problems, and its experience in managing its 
administrative responsibilities generally, which include rulemaking, 
adjudication, investigation, negotiation, and prosecution.76  Furthermore, 
and related to this point of competence, the disparity between the expertise 
of the agency and that of the court has only widened in recent years as 
federal statutory programs have become more complex.77  The complexity 
is such that most federal judges would be unable to conceive of all of the 
ramifications triggered by the narrow questions that come before them.78  
And the complexity of federal statutory law is not limited to multiple or 
conflicting purposes but also includes the existence of interlocking 
provisions that only an expert may fully comprehend.79  Accordingly, some 
scholars suggest that a practice in favor of deference to agency 
interpretations is necessary to ensure that laws are “internally coherent.”80 
Third, scholars identify agency flexibility, noting that once a court has 
interpreted a statute, it is unlikely that the interpretation may change 
because of principles of stare decisis; in contrast, an agency is free to 
change its own interpretation in light of new scientific or other 
developments (so long as it remains reasonable).81  Thus, if the 
interpretative responsibility belonged to the judiciary, this would restrict the 
agency’s flexibility to adapt to new technology or policy considerations.82 
Finally, considerations of national uniformity provide further support for 
leaving the statutory interpretations in the hands of the relevant agency.83  
Agencies face lawsuits across the country, and if the judiciary does not 
adhere to Chevron principles uniformly, then the agency would be subject 
to differing and inconsistent rulings, a result that would frustrate the goal of 
 
 73. Id. (quoting Mashaw, supra note 70, at 95). 
 74. Id. at 257. 
 75. Id. at 258. 
 76. Id. (citing Starr, supra note 70, at 309–10). 
 77. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 55, at 861. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 862. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Byse, supra note 70, at 259. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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a uniform, nationwide administration.84  A presumption in favor of the 
agency would prevent a national law that varied in application from region 
to region.85 
Other scholars argue that separation of powers requires courts to award 
deference to an agency’s reasonable and permissible interpretation of its 
statute.86  These scholars suggest that courts owe deference to agency 
interpretations because the agency-court relationship is not a supervisory 
relationship but rather is a relationship between two branches of 
government and thus premised on norms of respect and noninterference.87  
Though the deference courts owe to agencies is not on par with the 
deference courts accord to Congress or the President, it remains that the 
congressional decision to delegate power to an agency (and that agency’s 
political accountability via the executive) compel courts to defer where the 
agency presents a reasonable statutory interpretation.88 
Moreover, Congress does not always speak in precise language, nor does 
it expressly delegate when and how courts should award deference.89  
When the legislature has not been clear, courts should, in the first instance, 
attempt to determine what Congress may have intended.90  Where the 
courts cannot determine the congressional intent,91 courts should engage in 
a value assessment of which regime is the “most sensible one to attribute to 
Congress under the circumstances.”92  As Professor Sunstein notes, “[t]his 
assessment is not a mechanical exercise of uncovering an actual legislative 
decision,” but one which “calls for a frankly value-laden judgment about 
comparative competence, undertaken in light of the regulatory structure and 
applicable constitutional considerations.”93 
As a separate matter, though some have argued for the elimination of 
Skidmore from the deference regime,94 the relevance of the framework and 
recent scholarship on its reemergence within the context of Chevron 
support the position that Skidmore remains an integral part separately from 
 
 84. Id. (citing Strauss, supra note 70, at 1121–22). 
 85. Id. at 259–60; Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the 
Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 282 (1988). 
 86. Kmiec, supra note 85, at 269. 
 87. Id. at 270 (citing Starr, supra note 70, at 300). 
 88. Kmiec, supra note 85, at 281. 
 89. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 2086. 
 90. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 337–38 (1986) (arguing that statutory 
interpretation is a process of making a statute “the best piece of statesmanship it can be” by 
finding “the best justification . . . of a past legislative event”). 
 91. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 2086 (“Sometimes congressional views cannot plausibly 
be aggregated in a way that reflects a clear resolution of regulatory problems, many of them 
barely foreseen or indeed unforeseeable.”). 
 92. Id. (encouraging this method where the courts confront the more frequent issue of 
one agency’s interpretations).  Professor Sunstein’s suggestion is just as applicable where 
two or more agencies vie for deference. See infra Part III. 
 93. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 2086. 
 94. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 256–59 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Claire R. Kelly, The Brand X Liberation:  Doing Away with Chevron’s Second 
Step As Well As Other Doctrines of Deference, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151, 195–98 (2010). 
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and as an implicit part of the Chevron analysis itself.95  Some scholars 
argue that an underappreciated feature of Chevron’s Step One requirement 
is that this process itself implicitly uses Skidmore.96  This is the case 
because the history of an agency’s interpretation is relevant to a court’s 
determination of whether Congress has delegated unambiguous authority to 
the agency.97  In assessing Step One, courts consider the consistency and 
the longstanding nature of the interpretation, both of which are explicit 
factors in Skidmore.98  An agency’s expertise, both a Skidmore factor and 
Chevron consideration, is also relevant to a court’s determination whether 
the statute supports the agency’s interpretation.99  Moreover, an agency’s 
participation in the statute’s legislative history is pertinent to the Step One 
inquiry.100  In this way, courts undertake the first step of Chevron through a 
Skidmore “lens,” giving Skidmore weight to the means by which the agency 
interpreted its authority under its authorizing statute.101 
B.   The Creation of Shared Regulatory Space 
Congress often delegates shared and overlapping regulatory authority to 
multiple agencies,102 and it is not unusual to see more than one agency 
responsible for certain regulated activity.103  Congress often delegates the 
same or similar functions to more than one agency or compartmentalizes 
regulatory space across multiple agencies, assigning each agency a discrete 
area to regulate.104  These instances are not uncommon—they are present in 
virtually all areas of social and economic regulation, from food safety to 
 
 95. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain:  A Comparative 
Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret 
Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 449; Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—
Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 
1145–46 (2012). 
 96. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 95, at 449; see also Byse, supra note 70, at 265–66. 
 97. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 95, at 449. 
 98. Id. at 449; Strauss, supra note 95, at 1145–46. 
 99. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 95, at 449. 
 100. Id. at 449 n.151 (noting that the Supreme Court emphasized the agency’s 
participation in the statute’s legislative history in United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 
U.S. 534, 549 (1940)). 
 101. Id. at 449–50.  In 1988, four years after the Supreme Court handed down Chevron, 
Clark Byse advocated for a Chevron Step One where courts pay particular attention to 
(a) the [agency’s] reasoning in support of its interpretation, (b) the potential or 
likelihood that later developments might indicate the appropriateness of a different 
interpretation, (c) the advantages of nationwide uniformity in the administration of 
federal statutes, (d) the desirability of allowing for presidential influence of 
policymaking, and (e) the fact that the [agency’s] interpretation, “while not 
controlling upon the courts . . . , do[es] constitute a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which [the reviewing court] . . . may properly resort for 
guidance.” 
Byse, supra note 70, at 266 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
 102. See, e.g., FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583, 593 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Thompson Med. Co., Inc. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 
 103. See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1; Gersen, supra note 1, at 160; Marisam, 
supra note 1; Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence:  Structuring 
and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1699–701 (2006). 
 104. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1, at 1134. 
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financial regulation.105  For example, both the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are responsible for antitrust 
enforcement, even though in theory only one agency is necessary to enforce 
U.S. antitrust policies.106  On the other hand, the FTC and DOJ may have 
different characteristics that, when taken together, lead to a more 
comprehensive antitrust enforcement regime.107 
Another example is the food safety regulatory system, where fifteen 
federal agencies are vested with varying responsibilities for ensuring food 
safety.108  Under the current scheme, the FDA,109 the USDA,110 the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS),111 the EPA,112 and the National 
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS),113 among others, each have some subset 
of responsibilities.  Though the agencies have coordinated with each other 
via interagency agreements,114 the potential for conflict of interpretation 
remains.115 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1146 (citing Kelly Everett, Trust Issues:  Will President Barack Obama 
Reconcile the Tenuous Relationship Between Antitrust Enforcement Agencies?, 29 J. NAT’L 
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 727, 754–58 (2009)). 
 107. As Freeman and Rossi point out, while DOJ is an agency of the executive branch, 
the FTC is an independent agency, and in addition to their different structures and levels of 
political accountability, the agencies possess differing (and arguably complementary) 
features, including expertise, resources, and remedial tools. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1, 
at 1146. 
 108. Id. at 1147 (citing Lyndsey Layton, Unsafe Eggs Linked to U.S. Failure to Act, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2010, at A1). 
 109. The FDA performs the principal role and governs the food safety standards for 
almost all food products. Id. at 1147 & n.49. 
 110. The USDA is responsible for governing the food safety standards related to meat, 
poultry, and processed egg products. Id. 
 111. DHS is responsible for food security via monitoring and surveillance programs and 
as such, creates vulnerability assessments, mitigation strategies, and response plans. Id. at 
1147 & n.51. 
 112. The EPA regulates, among other things, the toxicity of pesticides and maximum 
allowable residue levels on food commodities and animal feed. Id. at 1147 & nn.52–53. 
 113. NMFS, a component of the Department of Commerce, is responsible for conducting 
fee-for-service inspections of seafood safety and quality. Id. at 1147 & nn.49–51; see also 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-435T, FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF FOOD 
SAFETY:  FDA’S FOOD PROTECTION PLAN PROPOSES POSITIVE FIRST STEPS, BUT CAPACITY TO 
CARRY THEM OUT IS CRITICAL 3 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/ 
118821.pdf. 
 114. A typical interagency agreement resembles a contract in that it assigns responsibility 
between the agencies, establishes procedures, and binds the agencies to fulfill mutual 
commitments. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1, at 1161.  However, these agreements are 
generally unenforceable and unreviewable by courts. Id.  For further reading on other agency 
coordination tools, including interagency consultation, joint policymaking, and presidential 
coordination, all of which agencies may use where overlapping regulatory space exists, see 
id. at 1155–81. 
 115. For further examples of multiple agencies administering the same regulatory space, 
see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-318SP, OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE 
POTENTIAL DUPLICATION IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, SAVE TAX DOLLARS, AND ENHANCE 
REVENUE 5–154 (2011), available at http:// www.gao.gov/new.items/d11318sp.pdf 
(identifying thirty-four areas of duplicative agency programs); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 
1, at 1151. 
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The following subsections examine these delegations of shared authority, 
first by outlining theoretical approaches to the types of congressional 
delegations of authority, and then second by providing real examples of 
these theoretical approaches, which illustrate the shared regulatory spaces 
that exist.  These actual examples are presented through the lens of 
authority creation and include (1) the creation of shared regulatory space 
through a single statute, (2) the piecemeal creation of shared regulatory 
space through multiple statutes, and (3) the creation of potential shared 
regulatory space through ambiguous statutes.  This section’s organization 
recognizes that framing the types of congressional delegations reflects only 
the end result of those delegations—simply the kinds of shared regulatory 
space that may exist.  Accordingly, the beginning—the creation of that 
shared regulatory space, including the when, why, and how—provides the 
other half of the background on the existence of shared regulatory space.  
The next section takes up that analysis. 
1.   Theoretical Approaches to the Creation 
of Shared Regulatory Jurisdiction 
As Professor Gersen explains, when Congress seeks to enact legislation 
authorizing two agencies to regulate some policy space, there are four 
theoretical models for the potential shared regulatory schemes.116  The four 
variations turn on two elements:  (1) exclusivity, that is, whether Congress 
seeks to delegate authority to one agency alone or to both, and 
(2) completeness, that is, whether Congress seeks to delegate authority to 
act over the entire policy space or only a subset of the space.117  As an 
example, if both agencies receive concurrent authority, Congress has 
created a jurisdictional overlap, but if neither agency receives authority, 
then Congress has created a jurisdictional underlap.118 
The first variation involves situations where Congress delegates complete 
and exclusive jurisdiction to the first agency over half a policy space and 
complete and exclusive jurisdiction to the second agency over the other 
half.119  In this variation, on its face, Congress has not created overlapping 
authority.120 
The second variation encompasses those situations where Congress 
delegates incomplete and exclusive jurisdiction to each agency, which is to 
say that, while the statute on its face has not created an overlap of authority, 
there remains some element of the policy space that belongs to neither 
agency (jurisdictional underlap).121 
 
 116. Gersen, supra note 1, at 208–09.  For an alternate taxonomy on authority allocation, 
see Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Functional Government in 3-D:  A 
Framework for Evaluating Allocations of Government Authority, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 19, 
37–61 (2014). 
 117. Gersen, supra note 1, at 208. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 208–09. 
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The third variation involves Congress delegating complete authority, 
which is to say, the entire policy space has someone regulating it, but the 
authority is nonexclusively assigned.122  This means that Congress has 
given some authority to both agencies such that jurisdiction is partially 
overlapping.123 
The fourth and final variation involves Congress delegating incomplete 
and nonexclusive authority to both agencies.124  Here, each agency shares 
some portion of its delegated authority with the other agency—
jurisdictional overlap—and like the second variation, there is jurisdictional 
underlap in that some portion of the policy space goes unassigned.125 
Congress may have different policy reasons for creating such schemes.  
Some political scientists have argued that overlapping and potentially 
duplicative delegations might benefit Congress.126  In turn, legal scholars 
have argued that overlapping regulatory jurisdiction can produce positive 
effects because the overlap creates a productive competition among the 
agencies,127 prompting them to produce “policy-relevant information.”128  
Another scholar argues that overlapping regulatory authority across 
multiple agencies may reduce congressional monitoring costs129 because 
the overlap creates a system of interagency “fire alarms.”130  Another 
articulation rests on public choice theory:  overlapping delegations provide 
congressional members with opportunities to take credit for decisions that 
benefit their constituents and deflect blame on the agencies when things go 
awry.131 
Further, Congress may be legislating in order to avoid giving a single 
agency responsibilities that conflict:  tasking an agency to further the goals 
of private industry while also tasking the same agency to promote general 
 
 122. Id. at 209. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id.  In addition to creating the potential for inconsistency and ambiguity among 
agencies, variations three and four often create duplication of efforts and redundancy of 
mission. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-318SP, OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE 
POTENTIAL DUPLICATION IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, SAVE TAX DOLLARS, AND ENHANCE 
REVENUE 5–154 (2011), available at http:// www.gao.gov/new.items/d11318sp.pdf 
(identifying thirty-four areas of duplicative agency programs).  For a comprehensive 
discussion of congressional duplication and redundancy, both intentional and inadvertent, 
see Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory 
Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237 (2011); Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies:  
Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010); Eric Biber, The 
More the Merrier:  Multiple Agencies and the Future of Administrative Law Scholarship, 
125 HARV. L. REV. F. 78 (2012); Doran, supra note 1; and Marisam, supra note 1. 
 126. See, e.g., Michael M. Ting, A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 274 (2003). 
 127. Gersen, supra note 1, at 212. 
 128. Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1463 (2011). 
 129. William A. Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617, 636–38 
(1975). 
 130. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:  
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984). 
 131. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1, at 1139–40. 
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public interest can and does lead to agencies focusing on the short-term 
industry interests at the expense of the long-term public interests.132  In fact, 
it was these kinds of conflicting missions that prompted Congress to strip 
the Atomic Energy Commission of its development (furthering private 
industry) and safety (furthering general public interest) missions and give 
the development mission to the Department of Energy and the safety 
mission to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.133 
2.   Original Creation of Shared Regulatory Jurisdiction Statutes 
Congress can pass a single statute that creates shared regulatory 
jurisdiction between two or more agencies.  This shared space can exist as 
either overlapping, compartmentalized, or competing jurisdiction. 
One example of overlapping regulatory jurisdiction lies in the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act of 1982,134 which vested authority in three federal 
agencies to oversee the Act’s purpose of disposing commercial nuclear 
waste in a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.135  Under the 
statutory scheme, the Department of Energy is responsible for designing 
and ultimately operating the repository, the EPA is responsible for 
establishing generally applicable standards for protecting the environment 
from releases of radioactive materials, and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission is responsible for licensing the Department of Energy’s 
proposed repository.136 
A second illustration is the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act,137 through which Congress vested 
compartmentalized and complementary authority in multiple agencies.  
Under the statutory regime, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 
(CFPB) role is to regulate financial products to protect consumers via 
rulemaking,138 but its rules are subject to review by the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC), which includes heads of the Federal Reserve 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) among the Council’s 
members.139  The U.S. Treasury Department also has authority under the 
Act, including the Treasury Secretary’s affirmative vote to subject a 
 
 132. Barkow, supra note 125, at 50–52; see also Biber, supra note 7, at 7 (“[A]gents will 
have systematic incentives to privilege certain goals over others—specifically, to privilege 
goals that are easily measured over conflicting goals that are difficult to measure.”). 
 133. Biber, supra note 7, at 33; Protecting the Public Interest:  Understanding the Threat 
of Agency Capture:  Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts, 
111th Cong. 5–7 (2010) (statement of Nicholas Bagley, Assistant Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan Law School). 
 134. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2012). 
 135. See id. § 10133. 
 136. See id. §§ 10132–10135 (describing the various roles of the government agencies). 
 137. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in sections of 7, 
12, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42 U.S.C.). 
 138. 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012); see also id. § 5512(b)(4)(B) (treating CFPB as if it “were 
the only agency authorized to apply, enforce, interpret, or administer the provisions 
of . . . Federal consumer financial law”). 
 139. Id. § 5321(b) (establishing the composition of FSOC); id. § 5513(c)(3)(A) (requiring 
a two-thirds vote). 
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nonbank financial institution to supervision by the Federal Reserve,140 and 
the power to initiate a liquidation process if he determines that a financial 
company is in default or is in danger of default where default would 
endanger the U.S. economy.141 
A third example involves the so-called split-enforcement model for 
agency adjudications, which is where Congress divides a major area of 
regulatory activity between two wholly separate and independent agencies, 
giving one agency rulemaking authority and the second agency adjudicatory 
authority.142  The split-enforcement model differs from the better-known 
arrangement where a single agency is responsible for all administrative or 
regulatory functions, including rulemaking and enforcement.143  In this 
way, the shared jurisdiction is arguably competing. 
Several pieces of legislation conform to this model.  One example is the 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977144 (MSHA), 
which assigns “developing and promulgating mandatory safety and health 
standards for the nation’s mining industry” to the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration.145  The independent Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Review Commission, which is composed of five members, adjudicates 
challenges to those standards.146  At the time that Congress enacted MSHA, 
it was a unique model, but Congress has used the split-enforcement model 
more since then.147 
Another illustration is the Occupational Safety and Health Act148 
(OSHA).  The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (whose 
parent agency is the Department of Labor) is responsible for setting and 
enforcing health and safety standards, while the three-member Occupational 
Safety and Health Review Commission is responsible for adjudicating 
challenges to those standards.149  In Martin v. Occupational Safety & 
Health Review Commission,150 the Supreme Court confronted a conflict 
between the Secretary of Labor and the Health Review Commission arising 
out of OSHA.151  As discussed in more detail later,152 the Court adhered to 
the presumption that Congress delegates law-interpreting or “force of 
 
 140. Id. § 5323(a)(1). 
 141. Id. § 5383(b).  For a more comprehensive summary of the Dodd-Frank Act, see 
Jacob E. Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street:  The New Administrative Process, 
65 ADMIN. L. REV. 689, 693–709 (2013). 
 142. George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model:  Some Conclusions from 
the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 315 (1987). 
 143. Id. 
 144. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–962 (2012). 
 145. Johnson, supra note 142, at 316. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 315. 
 148. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2012). 
 149. Johnson, supra note 142, at 315; Hinson v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 57 F.3d 1144, 
1147 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (split-enforcement in the area of aviation). 
 150. 499 U.S. 144 (1991). 
 151. See generally Russell L. Weaver, Deference to Regulatory Interpretations:  Inter-
Agency Conflicts, 43 ALA. L. REV. 35 (1991). 
 152. See infra Part II.A.2. 
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law”153 authority to a single agency154 and ultimately held that the 
Secretary of Labor was the agency entitled to deference, not the 
Commission.155 
3.   Piecemeal Creation of Shared Regulatory Jurisdiction Statutes 
Congress can provide authority to one agency but then can give authority 
to a second agency by passing a subsequent piece of legislation.  Piecemeal 
legislation is not unusual, and the creation of overlapping regulatory 
authority may not be intentional; instead, it may simply result from the way 
that Congress creates legislation on a “rolling basis,” where Congress 
amends or revises existing statutory schemes to grant authority to additional 
agencies.156  Because of this process, many times when there is overlapping 
regulatory jurisdiction, it is the actions of several Congresses.157  This 
piecemeal process can lead to the unintended consequence of inconsistent 
or overlapping jurisdictions over regulatory areas.158 
One example of this piecemeal legislation involves Congress’s efforts to 
regulate unsafe food additives in 1958 with the passage of the Food 
Additives Amendment, which empowered the FDA to regulate such 
additives.159  At the time of passage, the USDA was responsible for the 
regulation of meat additives under the Meat Inspection Act of 1906.160  
Congress specifically stated in the new bill that any meat additive that the 
USDA had approved prior to 1958 was presumed safe and therefore exempt 
from FDA review.161  In an effort to harmonize the overlapping regulatory 
space the 1958 Act created, Congress passed the Food Additives 
 
 153. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (reasoning that deference 
is owed an agency “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency 
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming 
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority”). 
 154. According to Gersen, the Court implied the idea of single-agency deference by the 
way the Court phrased the issue before it:  “The question before us in this case is to which 
administrative actor—the Secretary or the Commission—did Congress delegate this 
‘interpretive’ lawmaking power under the OSH Act.” Gersen, supra note 1, at 223 (quoting 
Martin, 499 U.S. at 151). 
 155. Martin, 499 U.S. at 157–58. 
 156. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1, at 1143.  A historical example of legislation passed 
on a rolling basis is Congress’s attempt to regulate the futures market. See Hunter v. FERC, 
711 F.3d 155, 157 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  As the court described in Hunter, Congress enacted the 
Future Trading Act in 1921, but the Supreme Court held the regulatory scheme 
unconstitutional. Id. (citing Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922)).  Thereafter, Congress 
enacted the Grain Futures Act in 1922 and the Commodity Exchange Act in 1936. Id.  Later, 
in 1974, Congress amended the Commodity Exchange Act to streamline the regulatory 
scheme and established the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Id. 
 157. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1, at 1143. 
 158. See id. (citing DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 7 
(2003)). 
 159. Food Additives Amendment of 1958, 21 U.S.C. § 348 (2012) (delegating the 
authority to review all food additives to the FDA). 
 160. Id. § 601 (delegating the authority to regulate all meat products to the USDA). 
 161. Id. § 321(s)(4); see also Pub. Citizen v. Foreman, 631 F.2d 969, 972 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) (discussing the “grandfather,” or “prior sanction,” exemption). 
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Amendment of 1958,162 which created a presumption that a food additive 
was unsafe (1) until proven otherwise or (2) unless the additive had been 
exempted from this rule by statute or regulation.163  Although Congress 
attempted to stem a conflict between the agencies, a federal suit nonetheless 
arose that required the Court to determine whether a certain meat additive 
fell under either FDA or USDA control.164  This example illustrates both 
the piecemeal creation of shared regulatory space, as well as the conflict 
that may continue despite attempts at a congressional remedy.165 
This potential inconsistency or competing authority only becomes a live 
issue after the agencies find themselves trying to implement their 
overlapping regulatory obligations.166  In some instances, it could even be 
the judiciary that creates overlapping regulatory jurisdiction, interpreting a 
certain statute to vest authority in one agency where another agency may 
already have asserted regulatory jurisdiction.167 
4.   Ambiguity Within Shared Regulatory Jurisdiction Statutes 
Statutory ambiguity with respect to regulatory jurisdiction can come to 
exist in a few ways.  As noted above, Professor Gersen’s third and fourth 
variations illustrate theoretical examples where Congress delegates 
nonexclusive jurisdiction to two agencies, in one variation the jurisdiction is 
complete and in the other incomplete.168 
One example of such an ambiguous statutory provision that creates the 
potential for conflict is within the Biomass Energy and Alcohol Fuels 
Act.169  In that statute, Congress legislated that “[e]ither the Secretary of 
Agriculture or the Secretary of Energy may be the Secretary concerned in 
the case of any biomass energy project which will have an anticipated 
annual production capacity of 15,000,000 gallons or more of ethanol.”170  
In this way, either agency may regulate this particular area, and if the 
agencies do not agree, the provision on its face does not provide the 
judiciary guidance in resolving the conflict. 
Even where the statute does not appear to overlap on its face and actually 
appears to create very compartmentalized jurisdictions between two or 
more agencies, an ambiguity may still arise.  For example, in the 
 
 162. Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784. 
 163. 21 U.S.C. § 348(a) (1976). 
 164. See Foreman, 631 F.2d 969. 
 165. See Marisam, supra note 1, at 191–93. 
 166. Id. at 191–92. 
 167. Id. at 210 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007)).  In 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court created a potential regulatory jurisdiction overlap between 
the EPA’s obligation to regulate vehicle emissions and the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration’s regulation of vehicle fuel economy when the majority interpreted the Clean 
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), to authorize the EPA with the regulation of greenhouse 
gases. 549 U.S. at 532. 
 168. See supra notes 116–25 and accompanying text. 
 169. 42 U.S.C. § 8801 (2012). 
 170. Id. § 8812(a)(2)(A). 
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Commodity Exchange Act,171 Congress authorized the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) to regulate trading of futures contracts, 
including futures on securities and options on futures contracts.172  
Congress had previously authorized the SEC to regulate trading of 
securities and options on securities.173  Where an instrument was both a 
security and a futures contract, the CFTC was to be the sole regulator 
because the Commodity Exchange Act had explicitly held the CFTC to 
have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to transactions involving contracts 
of sale (and options on such contracts) for future delivery.174  Where the 
instrument was both a futures contract and an option on a security, the SEC 
was to be the sole regulator as the Commodity Exchange Act had carved 
out authority preventing the CFTC from having jurisdiction over any 
transaction whereby the party to such transaction acquired any put, call, or 
other option on one or more securities.175 
In Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC,176 the Seventh Circuit 
considered this now modified regulatory scheme because while the CFTC 
regulates futures and options on futures and the SEC regulates securities 
and options on securities per this compartmentalization, the Commodity 
Exchange Act did not define either contracts for future delivery or future 
options.177  As a result, the financial instrument at issue in the case (index 
participation) could have been characterized as either options on futures or 
options on securities, and thus either the CFTC or SEC could have 
reasonably asserted authority over index participation.178 
II.   THE CHEVRON TWO-STEP AND THE SKIDMORE SHUFFLE:179  
THE COURTS CONSIDER DEFERENCE AMONG MULTIPLE AGENCIES 
When reviewing an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute or 
another statute giving the agency authority to regulate, courts may give 
deference to that agency’s interpretation either under Chevron or 
Skidmore.180  These cases almost always involve one federal agency’s 
 
 171. 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 172. Id. § 2(a)(1)(A). 
 173. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012). 
 174. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1).  However, the litigation that arose from this conflict, Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989), arose before subsequent 
statutory revisions and, as such, is identified in the case as being codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii) 
(1988). 883 F.2d at 539. 
 175. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(C)(ii) (identified in Chi. Mercantile Exch., 883 F.2d at 539, as 
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2a(i) (1988)). 
 176. 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 177. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 883 F.2d at 539. 
 178. Id. at 539–48.  The Seventh Circuit ultimately determined that the CFTC had 
jurisdiction over the financial instrument. Id. at 548. 
 179. For the credit on this play on words and an examination on courts’ deference 
considerations for positions advanced for the first time in litigation, see Bradley George 
Hubbard, Comment, Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretations First Advanced in 
Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and the Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 447 (2013). 
 180. See supra notes 47–69 and accompanying text. 
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interpretation of one statute,181 and underlying the Chevron opinion itself is 
the assumption that only one agency is responsible for the statute at 
issue.182  However, Congress does not always vest administrative authority 
in only a single agency, and there are many occasions when Congress has 
apportioned authority between two or more agencies.183  When two 
agencies have shared authority under the same regulatory scheme, whether 
the shared authority is overlapping, competing, or compartmentalized, those 
agencies may disagree regarding the interpretation of certain provisions that 
both agencies administer.184  Often times, federal agencies will have similar 
interpretations of the statute they administer.185  Other times, these agencies 
will have inconsistent interpretations or will disagree with each other 
outright over the correct interpretation.186 
Because a reviewing court may award deference to only one of these 
agencies when their interpretations are inconsistent,187 courts have 
conducted varying reviews in reaching a holding.  This part first provides a 
historical survey outlining judicial review of deference conflicts arising 
from shared regulatory space and then sets out several cases where the 
Supreme Court and circuit courts have confronted conflicts between two or 
more agencies seeking deference to its respective statutory interpretation. 
 
 181. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FAA, 564 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(finding valid the Federal Aviation Administration’s interpretation of a provision in the 
Airport and Airway Improvement Act). 
 182. According to Gersen, the Supreme Court implies this idea by the way it phrased the 
issue presented in Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 499 U.S. 
144 (1991):  “The question before us in this case is to which administrative actor—the 
Secretary or the Commission—did Congress delegate this ‘interpretive’ lawmaking power 
under the OSH Act.” Gersen, supra note 1, at 223 (quoting Martin, 499 U.S. at 151). See 
also William Weaver, Note, Multiple-Agency Delegations & One-Agency Chevron, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 275, 277 (2014) (“The traditional Chevron framework is a one-agency model 
and is thus inappropriate for judicial review of the complex, multiagency form of 
congressional delegation.”). 
 183. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42 
U.S.C.) (apportioning authority between the Consumer Fraud Protection Bureau, Federal 
Reserve, Securities & Exchange Commission, and U.S. Department of Treasury); see also 
Weaver, supra note 151, at 37 n.10–12 (listing cases); infra Part I.B (describing the Dodd-
Frank Act’s delegations to multiple agencies). 
 184. See, e.g., Caiola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting “[t]he 
diffusion of the interpretive authority among several agencies, and the possibility of 
inconsistent interpretations”). 
 185. See, e.g., Individual Reference Servs. Grp., Inc. v. FTC, 145 F. Supp. 2d 6, 16, 23 
(D.D.C. 2001) (regulations were the result of coordinated effort among six agencies:  FTC, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, and the National 
Credit Union Administration), aff’d sub nom. Trans Union LLC v. FTC, 295 F.3d 42 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002). 
 186. See, e.g., Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144 
(1991) (outlining the conflict between the Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission and the Secretary of Labor). 
 187. Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 246 (2004) (noting that Chevron analysis as it stands now may not 
resolve the dispute between two agencies because if a court awards deference to one, it 
“offends the principle of deference to the view of the other”). 
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A.   How Courts Adjudicate Shared Agency Jurisdiction 
The APA authorizes courts to review an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute it administers.188  However, judicial review is not simply limited to 
the standards in the APA.189  As the Supreme Court held in Chevron, courts 
should accept a federal administrative agency’s interpretation of its own 
governing statute and regulations if “Congress has not directly addressed 
the precise question at issue,” and if the interpretation is reasonable.190  
Chevron suggested that the degree of deference owed to an agency depends 
on each particular situation.191 
Under pre-Chevron case law, courts occasionally cited the fact that 
multiple agencies administered a statute as a factor for giving reduced 
deference to an agency’s interpretation.192  Relatedly, some courts adopted 
a presumption of exclusive jurisdiction, which holds that Congress would 
not vest law-interpreting authority in more than one agency; using this 
presumption, courts interpret the statute to favor only one agency having 
authority with the force of law despite multiple agencies receiving 
delegations of authority.193  For example, in California v. Kleppe,194 the 
Ninth Circuit asked whether two agencies, the EPA and the Secretary of 
Interior, had concurrent regulatory jurisdiction over air quality,195 and 
answered that question in the negative, holding that there was no 
overlapping jurisdiction because such authority would “impair or frustrate 
the authority which [the statute] grants to the Secretary.”196 
At the same time, though the Ninth Circuit presented a theory of 
exclusive jurisdiction, this position is in conflict with cases extending back 
into the mid-twentieth century.197  And as one court noted, “[o]ther 
agencies and their mandates . . . overlap,” and “not even a faint clue exists 
that Congress desired otherwise.”198  Other courts that had considered 
potentially overlapping jurisdiction schemes asserted that “when two 
regulatory systems are applicable to a certain subject matter, they are to be 
reconciled and, to the extent possible, both given effect.”199 
 
 188. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (stating that the “reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law”). 
 189. Id. § 706(2)(A) (stating that a court may invalidate a rule where the rule is “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law”). 
 190. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 191. Id. at 842–45. 
 192. See, e.g., N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 n.12 (1982); Gen. 
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 144–45 (1976). 
 193. Gersen, supra note 1, at 222–25. 
 194. 604 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 195. Id. at 1192. 
 196. Id. at 1193–94. 
 197. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 689–93 (1948) (approving concurrent 
FTC/DOJ jurisdiction); Pennsylvania v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 561 F.2d 278, 292 
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (approving concurrent Interstate Commerce Commission/Federal Maritime 
Commission jurisdiction); Friedlander v. U.S. Postal Serv., 658 F. Supp. 95, 103 (D.D.C. 
1987) (approving concurrent FDA/FTC/U.S. Postal Service jurisdiction). 
 198. Thompson Med. Co., Inc. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 199. Pennsylvania, 561 F.2d at 292. 
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Issues of conflicting agency interpretations arose soon after Chevron,200 
and the adjudication of those cases usually hinged on the assumption that 
the reviewing court’s task was limited to “decid[ing] which agency [wa]s in 
charge and defer[ring] to that agency’s interpretation.”201  As it stands now, 
courts typically do not award Chevron deference to interpretations of 
statutes of general applicability, such as the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) or the APA, which are administered by many agencies.202  This is 
so because none of the agencies claiming an entitlement to deference has a 
particular expertise in the substance of the statute.203 
Even where the authorizing statute is narrower than general 
administration, for example, only conferring authority to three agencies,204 
the courts approach the inquiry in a variety of ways.  In the D.C. Circuit, for 
example, if multiple agencies are charged with administering a statute, an 
agency’s interpretation is generally not entitled to Chevron deference;205 
 
 200. See, e.g., Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 752 F.2d 694 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985), rev’d sub nom. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 
597, 612–13 n.14 (1986) (reversing D.C. Circuit’s decision for “ignoring this longstanding 
administrative interpretation” when it ruled against the Department of Transportation’s 
predecessor agency when the President had tasked DOJ to coordinate all regulations 
implementing the various civil rights laws); Keyes v. Sec’y of the Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 
1021 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that the Office of Personnel Management had primary 
responsibility for administering the competitive service, and the Secretary of the Navy was 
bound by that interpretation). 
 201. Weaver, supra note 151, at 39. 
 202. See, e.g., Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137–38 n.9 (1997) (holding 
that agency’s interpretation of the APA is not entitled to Chevron deference because the 
APA is not a statute the agency is “charged with administering”); Bowen v. Am. Hosp. 
Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 642 n.30 (1986) (holding that the Court owes no deference to one 
agency’s interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act); Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 786 
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 847 (2013) (reversing the lower court’s award of 
Chevron deference to the National Institute of Health because the statutory authority at issue 
was an “annual rider by its terms appli[cable] generally to multiple agencies”); Grand 
Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339, 341–42 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding “the court owes no 
deference” to an agency’s interpretation of the National Environmental Policy Act because 
all federal agencies are responsible for the Act’s administration); Proffitt v. Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp., 200 F.3d 855, 860 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that the court owes no deference to one 
agency’s interpretation of a statute of limitations); Benavides v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 995 
F.2d 269, 272 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that the court owes no deference to agency’s 
interpretation of the Privacy Act). 
 203. See Collins v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 351 F.3d 1246, 1252–53 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(“Where a statute is generic, two bases for the Chevron presumption of implied delegation 
are lacking:  specialized agency expertise and the greater likelihood of achieving a unified 
view through the agency than through review in multiple courts.” (citing Rehabilitation 
Ass’n of Va., Inc. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1471 (4th Cir. 1994))). 
 204. See, e.g., Use of Real Property to Assist the Homeless, 56 Fed. Reg. 23,789 (May 
24, 1991) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 581, 41 C.F.R. pt. 101-47, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 12a) 
(identifying the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, General Services 
Administration, and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development as promulgators 
of a joint interim final rule). 
 205. Caiola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding deference 
inappropriate because the regulation was written and promulgated by the Department of 
Defense, General Services Administration, and National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration and the “diffusion of the interpretive authority among several agencies, and 
the possibility of inconsistent interpretations, weaken the case for deference”); see also 
Hunter v. FERC, 711 F.3d 155, 156–57 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (declining to defer to either agency 
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rather, the court reviews the agency’s interpretation de novo.206  In a similar 
vein, where there is even the potential for conflicting regulations as a result 
of multiple agencies administering the same statute, the Third Circuit holds 
that Chevron is precluded entirely.207 
In contrast, the Second Circuit adopted a different approach to the 
deference question in 1185 Avenue of Americas Associates v. Resolution 
Trust Corp.  First, the court stated that it did not owe the full Chevron 
deference to any interpretation, and then it determined which interpretation 
was most reasonable between those proffered.208 
When analyzing the level of deference to award, if any, different courts 
accord varying emphasis based on a host of factors, including whether one 
agency is executive and the other is independent,209 the statutory scheme,210 
expertise,211 and political accountability.212 
 
regarding a “jurisdictional turf war” between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission).  But see U.S. Postal Serv. v. Postal 
Regulatory Comm’n, 599 F.3d 705, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (deferring to the Postal Regulatory 
Commission because the particular provision at issue is the responsibility of the 
Commission even though both the USPS and Commission have authority under the statute).  
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit withholds Chevron deference both in instances of actual agency 
conflict and potential agency conflict. See Rapaport v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 59 F.3d 212, 
216–17 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding Chevron inapplicable either where “the same statute is 
interpreted differently by the several agencies or the one agency that happens to reach the 
courthouse first is allowed to fix the meaning of the text for all”); see also Wachtel v. Office 
of Thrift Supervision, 982 F.2d 581, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 206. Grant Thornton, LLP v. Office of Comptroller of the Currency, 514 F.3d 1328, 1331 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that no automatic deference is owed to Office of the Comptroller 
of Currency on the interpretation of Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)); Rapaport, 59 F.3d at 216–17 (no automatic deference 
to Office of Thrift Supervision on the interpretation of FIRREA).  The D.C. Circuit helpfully 
divided the shared-enforcement schemes into three types. Collins v. Nat’l Transp. Safety 
Bd., 351 F.3d 1246, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2003).   First, where the statutes are generic, like the 
APA and FOIA, the “broadly sprawling applicability undermines any basis for deference, 
and courts must therefore review interpretative questions de novo.” Id.  For statutes where 
multiple agencies have specialized enforcement responsibilities, but there exists a risk of 
inconsistent enforcement or uncertainty in the law because the agencies’ authorities overlap, 
courts may find de novo review necessary. Id.  Third, where expert enforcement agencies 
have mutually exclusive authority over separate sets of regulated persons per statutory 
outline, concerns about inconsistency and uncertainty do not diminish the weight of Chevron 
deference. Id. 
 207. Chao v. Cmty. Trust Co., 474 F.3d 75, 85 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The mere fact that there 
could be conflicting regulations should preclude Chevron deference.”); see also Catherine 
M. Sharkey, Agency Coordination in Consumer Protection, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 329, 
342–45 (describing the “traditional” approach of awarding no deference where more than 
one agency administers a statute). 
 208. See, e.g., 1185 Ave. of Ams. Assocs. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 22 F.3d 494, 497 
(2d Cir. 1994); see also Lieberman v. FTC, 771 F.2d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(“[W]here . . . Congress has entrusted more than one federal agency with the administration 
of a statute . . . a reviewing court does not . . . owe as much deference as it might otherwise 
give if the interpretation were made by a single agency similarly entrusted with powers of 
interpretation.”). 
 209. See, e.g., In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 440–41 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 210. See, e.g., Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 
151 (1991). 
 211. Thompson Med. Co., Inc. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 212. See, e.g., Martin, 499 U.S. at 156. 
1602 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
Though the Seventh Circuit has suggested that “it is possible to defer 
simultaneously to two incompatible agency positions,”213 presently there is 
no case that purports to do so. 
The Supreme Court has not resolved the issue of shared agency 
jurisdiction under Chevron.214  In Bragdon v. Abbott,215 the Court noted the 
question of whether enforcement by multiple agencies is incompatible with 
Chevron deference but did not resolve that question.216  One term later in 
Sutton v. United Air Lines,217 the Supreme Court confronted another case 
where multiple agencies vied for deference.  Though the Court highlighted 
the fact that Congress gave three agencies the authority to issue regulations 
implementing different provisions of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act,218 the Court ultimately concluded that it did not need to determine 
which agency deserved deference because all three agencies had adopted 
impermissible interpretations.219 
Because Congress continues to create shared regulatory jurisdiction,220 
“a court must proceed with the utmost caution before concluding that one 
agency may not regulate merely because another may.”221  Moreover, a 
court should exercise further caution when considering a claim that one 
agency has conclusively interpreted and settled an issue that an agency with 
a different substantive jurisdiction may later interpret with a different 
perspective.222 
The following cases illustrate the absence of a controlling deference 
scheme by presenting conflicts that have varying statutory origins, present 
varying types of shared regulatory spaces, and demonstrate the divergent 
judicial rationales where the courts confront two or more agencies seeking 
deference. 
1.   Chevron’s Applicability to Interagency Conflicts:  
ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri 
In 1988, the Supreme Court considered a case where two agencies 
proffered opposing interpretations of a particular statute.  Though the Court 
ultimately sidestepped the issue of determining which agency it owed 
deference, the case is important because the Court’s use of the Chevron 
 
 213. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. SEC, 187 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 214. See John F. Cooney, Chevron Deference and the Dodd-Frank Act, 37 ADMIN. & 
REG. L. NEWS, Spring 2012, at 7 (“[T]he question, long identified but not decided by the 
Supreme Court,” asks “which agency’s interpretation of a statute, if any, is entitled to 
deference under [Chevron], when Congress has delegated equal and overlapping authority to 
multiple agencies.”). 
 215. 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
 216. Id. at 642 (“[W]e need not pause to inquire whether this causes us to withhold 
deference to agency interpretations under [Chevron].”). 
 217. 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 218. Id. at 478–80. 
 219. Id. at 482. 
 220. Thompson Med. Co., Inc. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 221. FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583, 593 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Galliano v. U.S. 
Postal Serv., 836 F.2d 1362, 1369–70 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
 222. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc). 
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analysis counters the notion that interagency conflicts preclude the use of 
Chevron.  In ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri,223 the Secretary of the 
Interior entered into a contract with a private company that allowed the 
company to withdraw a specified quantity of water for industrial use from a 
large federal reservoir.224  Several states sued, seeking injunctive relief to 
prevent performance of the contract.225  These states argued that the 
Secretary of the Interior had no statutory authority to enter into such a 
contract, arguing that under the Flood Control Act of 1944,226 the authority 
to approve any withdrawal of water from the reservoir belonged to the 
Secretary of the Army, not the Department of the Interior.227  Moreover, the 
states pointed to, and both the district court and court of appeals held as 
undisputed, the fact that the Army Corps of Engineers, a part of the 
Department of the Army, had constructed the reservoir and controlled its 
operations.228 
The Flood Control Act envisioned that both the Department of the 
Interior and the Department of the Army229 would have roles in the 
development of the reservoir.230  In so envisioning, Congress allocated 
funds to both agencies to pursue their respective functions,231 required 
information-sharing between the agencies on any other projects within the 
affected area,232 and conferred authority to both Departments to take certain 
other actions in connection with the operation of the reservoir.233 
However, the Supreme Court rejected the Secretary of the Interior’s 
claim of entitlement to deference for the Department’s statutory 
interpretation because the statute clearly indicated that the Department of 
the Interior may not enter into a contract to withdraw water from an Army 
reservoir without the approval of the Department of the Army.234  The Court 
held that although the statute did delegate some authority over the ongoing 
administration of the project to the Department of the Interior, and although 
the text of the statute did not expressly speak to whether the Department 
 
 223. 484 U.S. 495 (1988). 
 224. Id. at 497–98. 
 225. Id. at 498. 
 226. Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887 (1944) (codified in scattered sections of titles 16, 
33, 43 U.S.C.). 
 227. ETSI, 484 U.S. at 498. 
 228. Id. at 498–99. 
 229. The Flood Control Act actually referred to the Department of War, which is the 
predecessor to the Department of the Army. Id. at 498. 
 230. Id. at 502. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 503. 
 233. See id. at 503–05. 
 234. See id. at 517.  The statute specifically authorized “the Secretary of War . . . to make 
contracts . . . at such prices and on such terms as he may deem reasonable, for domestic and 
industrial uses for surplus water that may be available at any reservoir under the control of 
the War Department.” Id. at 504 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court reasoned that 
this explicit delegation to the Secretary of War entirely undermined the Department of the 
Interior’s argument that the various powers granted to him could permit the contracts the 
Department had entered into with ETSI Pipeline. Id. at 505.  As a result, any contracts the 
Department of Interior sought to create required the concurrence of the Secretary of the 
Army, to whom Congress gave the authority to make such contracts. Id. 
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had contractual authority, the reference to the Secretary of the Army’s 
contractual power compelled the conclusion that the Department of the 
Interior lacked the authority to contract.235 
Accordingly, as between the interpretations proffered by both agencies, 
the Court found that the Interior Secretary’s argument failed at Chevron 
Step One, since the statute “indicate[d] clearly that the Interior Secretary 
may not enter into a contract to withdraw water . . . without the approval of 
the Department of the Army.”236  Finding that the Interior Secretary failed 
at Step One, the Court saw no need to continue with the Chevron test.  
However, the importance of this case is not the determination the Court 
made, but rather the fact that the Court used Chevron to assess an 
interagency conflict over statutory interpretation.  This provides support for 
the position that interagency conflicts and multiple delegations do not 
preclude either Chevron analysis or Chevron deference. 
2.   Deference Awarded:  
Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission 
Though the Court did not label the deference it ultimately confers to the 
Secretary of Labor,237 the important consequence of the following case is 
that the Court engaged the facts and statutory interpretations each agency 
proffered and determined that one agency’s interpretation merited deference 
over the other.  In Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Commission,238 the controversy arose from the Secretary of Labor’s effort 
to enforce compliance with OSHA standards relating to coke-oven 
emissions.239  OSHA established a comprehensive regulatory scheme 
designed to ensure safe working conditions for all working individuals.240  
Here, the Secretary had used his rulemaking powers pursuant to OSHA to 
promulgate standards setting the maximum permissible emission levels and 
requiring the use of employee respirators in certain conditions.241  A Labor 
compliance officer found that the respondent before the Court, CF & I Steel 
Corporation, though having equipped many of its employees with 
respirators, equipped its employees with respirators that failed to protect 
their wearers from coke-oven carcinogenic emissions exceeding the 
regulatory limit.242  Based on these findings, the compliance officer issued 
a citation to CF & I for violating the regulation.243 
 
 235. Id. at 517. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1117–20 (2008), for further discourse on the Court’s common practice of 
engaging in ad hoc judicial reasoning in assessing deference without invoking particular 
deference regimes by name. 
 238. 499 U.S. 144 (1991). 
 239. Martin, 499 U.S. at 148. 
 240. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1988). 
 241. Martin, 499 U.S. at 148. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
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At the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC), 
an administrative law judge upheld the citation, which included upholding 
the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the regulation.244  On petition 
for a review of the full Commission, OSHRC reversed the administrative 
law judge’s decision, adopting a different interpretation.245  The Secretary 
of Labor disagreed with OSHRC’s interpretation and petitioned the Tenth 
Circuit for review.246 
Though concluding that the regulations were ambiguous, the Tenth 
Circuit found both the Secretary’s interpretation and OSHRC’s 
interpretation reasonable.247  As a result, the court confronted two 
permissible interpretations and had to choose to which agency to defer.248  
The court ultimately reasoned that because Congress gave OSHRC 
adjudicative power, which the Tenth Circuit found to “necessarily 
encompass[] the power to ‘declare’ the law,” OSHRC prevailed.249 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.250  The Court considered so-
called authority principles and concluded that the Secretary of Labor was 
entitled to deference over OSHRC.251  Although the Court considered 
several factors,252 the opinion emphasized OSHA’s statutory structure and 
the history of the statute.253  The Court found that the Secretary was in the 
best position to render authoritative interpretations because the Department 
of Labor is the agency authorized to promulgate the standards in the first 
instance and, therefore, is more familiar with the regulations’ purposes.254  
Moreover, the Court favored the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation because 
the Court assumed that Congress wanted interpretive power in the agency 
with the most expertise.255  The Court reasoned that because the Labor 
Secretary enforces OSHA, the Department of Labor confronts a wider range 
of regulatory problems and is therefore able to develop better expertise.256  
In contrast, OSHRC confronts only those problems that the Secretary 
contests, seeing only a subset of issues and is less likely to develop 
expertise.257 
The Court also considered OSHA’s legislative history, reading the 
Congressional Record to suggest that Congress preferred the Secretary’s 
 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 148–49. 
 246. Id. at 149. 
 247. Dole v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 891 F.2d 1495, 1497 (10th 
Cir. 1989), rev’d sub nom. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 
U.S. 144 (1991). 
 248. Id. at 1497. 
 249. Id. at 1498. 
 250. Martin, 499 U.S. at 150. 
 251. Id. at 150–54. 
 252. Id. at 152–58. 
 253. Id. at 152. 
 254. Id. at 152–54. 
 255. Id. at 152–53. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
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interpretations.258  Because Congress gave the Secretary the power to 
promulgate regulations, the Court reasoned that Congress must have 
intended to give the Secretary interpretive authority.259  To hold otherwise 
would vest two agencies with implementing OSHA’s policy objectives, 
which the Court considered unreasonable.260  The Court held that Congress 
delegated to OSHRC limited adjudicative power,261 distinguishing between 
agencies like OSHRC, which exercise only adjudicative authority, and 
traditional administrative agencies—agencies that have a unitary structure 
composed of legislative, enforcement, and adjudicative powers—which are 
free to make law by either regulation or adjudication.262  The Court held 
that unitary agencies possess broad authority because Congress delegated to 
them power to make law and policy through rulemaking, and since the only 
means available to OSHRC was adjudication, the Court declined to “infer 
that Congress expected the Commission to use its adjudicatory power to 
play a policymaking role.”263 
The Court concluded that because OSHRC’s role was similar to the role 
of a reviewing court, and similar to the courts’ roles in agency interpretation 
matters, OSHRC should not have substituted its judgment for the 
Secretary’s.264  Congress authorized OSHRC “to review the Secretary’s 
interpretations only for consistency with the regulatory language and for 
reasonableness.”265  The Court limited OSHRC’s role to making 
authoritative factual findings; as to legal questions, its role is that of a 
“neutral arbiter,” undertaking only a limited review of the Secretary’s 
interpretations.266 
Though important because of the conferral of deference, Martin is not 
dispositive on all cases involving shared regulatory space.  The Court was 
careful to limit its holding to OSHA and declined to take a position “on the 
division of enforcement and interpretive powers within other regulatory 
schemes that conform to the split-enforcement structure.”267  This caveat 
has not prevented other courts from applying this reasoning to the split-
enforcement cases they confront.268  Courts narrowly construing Martin use 
it as precedent for OSHA cases only,269 while other courts broadly 
construing Martin use it for split-enforcement models of shared regulatory 
space.270  Other courts do not view Martin as dispositive in split-
enforcement model cases and accordingly engage in their own reasoning to 
 
 258. Id. at 153. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 153–54. 
 261. Id. at 154. 
 262. Id. 
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 264. Id. at 154–55. 
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 269. See, e.g., Perez v. Loren Cook Co., 750 F.3d 1006, 1009 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 270. See, e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. Twentymile Coal Co., 456 F.3d 151, 161 (D.C. Cir. 
2006). 
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determine the application, if any, of deference to an agency 
interpretation.271 
*     *     * 
Taken together, Martin and ETSI can stand as examples that the Supreme 
Court does not object to a deference analysis in cases where multiple 
agencies administer the same statute.  A recent Supreme Court opinion 
illustrates that at least a portion of the current Court does not find 
multiagency statutes preclusive of deference.  In City of Arlington v. 
Federal Communications Commission,272 the Court considered whether it 
should award Chevron deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory 
ambiguity that concerned the scope of its regulatory jurisdiction.273  The 
majority reasoned that because the statute’s language allowed the agency to 
promulgate necessary rules and regulations, the agency’s decision that it 
had lawmaking power to fill in the ambiguity was within the scope of its 
statutory authority.274  In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by 
Justices Kennedy and Alito, stated that “whether a particular agency 
interpretation warrants Chevron deference turns on the court’s 
determination whether Congress has delegated to the agency the authority 
to interpret the statutory ambiguity at issue.”275  And to illustrate his point 
regarding what he viewed as the problems of allowing agencies to assert the 
boundaries of their jurisdiction, Chief Justice Roberts noted that “statutes 
that parcel out authority to multiple agencies . . . ‘may be the norm, rather 
than an exception,’”276 and insisted that a court cannot ask “whether the 
statute is one that the agency administers,” but rather should ask “whether 
authority over the particular ambiguity at issue has been delegated to the 
particular agency.”277  The inference from this passage is that a Chevron 
analysis is not at odds with a multiagency statute. 
3.   The Lower Courts Refuse Deference:  Salleh v. Christopher 
Construed broadly, Martin stands for the proposition that in a split-
enforcement model of shared regulatory space, a court considering the 
interpretations of the rule-promulgating agency and the reviewing agency 
should defer to the rule-promulgating agency; however, the following case 
rejects this reasoning and instead holds that where multiple agencies are 
responsible for shared space, deference is precluded.  In Salleh v. 
Christopher278 the Secretary of State discharged Jamari Salleh, a foreign 
service officer, even though the Foreign Service Grievance Board 
concluded that no cause for the discharge had been established at the 
 
 271. See, e.g., Hinson v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 57 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 272. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
 273. Id. at 1866. 
 274. Id. at 1874. 
 275. Id. at 1881 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 276. Id. at 1883 (quoting Gersen, supra note 1, at 208). 
 277. Id. at 1884. 
 278. 85 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
1608 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
applicable hearing.279  The State Department hired plaintiff Salleh in 1981 
and subsequently granted her career status.280  In 1989, Salleh pleaded 
guilty to an indictment alleging that she filed falsified claims with the U.S. 
government.281  After her conviction, the Acting Director General of the 
Foreign Service proposed her discharge.282  The Foreign Service Grievance 
Board conducted an evidentiary hearing on the discharge proposal and 
concluded that discharging Salleh would violate § 501 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 since her criminal conduct stemmed from her alcoholism, a 
disability under the Act.283 
Thirteen months later, the Secretary of State issued an order concluding 
that he “possesse[d] authority to review conclusions of the Foreign Service 
Grievance Board, and to reach a contrary conclusion if merited;” and so 
concluding, the Secretary of State directed Salleh’s discharge from the 
Service.284  In response, the Board protested, asserting that its decision was 
final and that the Secretary could not ignore it.285  Salleh filed an action 
under the APA seeking reinstatement, among other remedies.286  The 
district court held that because the Board’s decision was final, the 
Secretary’s discharge of Salleh was invalid.287 
The Secretary of State appealed, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.288  The 
analysis to determine which agency had final authority hinged on the proper 
interpretation of § 610(a) of the Foreign Service Act.289  The Secretary of 
State relied on the “plain meaning” of the provision to support his argument 
that he had plenary authority to discharge employees and that therefore his 
determination was entitled to Chevron deference.290  The Board, however, 
read the provision to delegate to it final authority to determine the validity 
of the Secretary’s discharge decisions.291  To bolster its argument, the 
Secretary cited a previous D.C. Circuit case where the court had deferred to 
the State Department regarding an interpretation of a provision in the same 
Act.292  The court rejected the argument that the previous case created a 
general rule that deference is owed to the Secretary, as opposed to the 
Board, highlighting that the provision at issue before the previous court 
explicitly delegated authority to the Secretary.293 
The court held it would be inappropriate to defer to either agency’s 
interpretation as to the issue of basic authority, noting it had never deferred 
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where two competing governmental entities asserted conflicting 
jurisdictional claims.294  The court stated that where Congress has delegated 
authority to multiple agencies, it has not implicitly delegated authority “to 
reconcile ambiguities or to fill gaps” to any one of those agencies.295  The 
court declined to defer to either the Secretary or the Board and instead 
opted to interpret the whole section of the statute de novo.296  The court 
looked at previous iterations of the particular provision at issue, other 
sections of previous iterations of the statute, the legislative history, and the 
plain meaning of the provision to determine that the Board had the correct 
interpretation of the Act.297 
Although the court declined to engage in a deference analysis for either 
agency because of the conflict, the means by which the court came to its 
determination are illustrative of the types of material courts can consult 
when confronted with interagency conflicts over deference (and are in fact 
what courts consult generally even in instances of single-agency deference 
questions).298 
4.   Applying Skidmore Rather than Chevron:  
Collins v. National Transportation Safety Board 
A court’s application of the less deferential Skidmore analysis to 
interagency conflict situations does not resolve the unequal treatment 
agencies have received where more than one agency administers the same 
statute, although it is arguably a better result than no deference.  For 
example, in Collins v. National Transportation Safety Board,299 the D.C. 
Circuit, in remanding the case back to the district court, speculated that 
although Chevron deference was not proper, the Skidmore analysis may 
be.300  In Collins, a Coast Guard administrative law judge made a finding 
that a Coast Guard–licensed pilot committed misconduct under the 1972 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS)301 
when he failed to sound a warning signal after he ascertained that another 
vessel was not taking sufficient action to avoid collision.302  The 
Commandant of the Coast Guard affirmed the finding, but the National 
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Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)303 reversed that determination.304  The 
Coast Guard appealed to the D.C. Circuit, and the pilot intervened.305 
The differing interpretations turned on the meaning of the word “doubt.”  
The Coast Guard interpreted doubt about the sufficiency of the other 
vessel’s actions to include both cases where  (1) one is uncertain whether 
the other vessel’s actions are sufficient and (2) one is certain that those 
actions are not sufficient.306  The NTSB found that the COLREGS’s text 
specifies that the warning signal requirement is triggered only when a pilot 
is “in doubt whether sufficient action [is] being taken by the [other vessel] 
to avoid collision.”307  According to the NTSB, “the rule cannot apply 
where a pilot is certain that sufficient action is not being taken.”308 
The D.C. Circuit viewed the Supreme Court’s split-enforcement opinion 
in Martin as similar to the case before the panel and assumed that some 
deference was proper.309  The court noted that even if the situation did not 
require Chevron deference, Skidmore deference could be applied given the 
Coast Guard’s specialized expertise in maritime safety and efficient 
administration of licensing and discipline procedures.310  Assuming 
Skidmore deference gave the Coast Guard’s decision more weight, the court 
found the Coast Guard’s COLREGS interpretation sufficiently persuasive 
that the NTSB erred in reversing the Coast Guard Commandant’s 
affirmance.311 
Accordingly, this case serves as an example of a court, though typically 
resistant of even considering the deference question between two 
conflicting agencies, relying on one agency’s specialized expertise and 
policy concerns of efficiency—policy considerations that animated Chevron 
and Skidmore312—to award Skidmore deference. 
B.   Policies and Considerations Regarding Interagency Conflicts 
Although there is some literature regarding the general topic of shared 
regulatory space and interagency conflict,313 not many have written on the 
appropriateness of awarding deference to one agency over another agency 
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in multiagency regulatory schemes.314  The following section outlines some 
of the discourse available on what factors a court should consider in 
reviewing a deference request in cases of interagency conflict. 
In his article discussing interagency conflict, Professor Weaver described 
an approach where, even though the court cannot defer to both agencies’ 
interpretations on the subject of jurisdiction between them, the court does 
not need to ignore the agencies’ interpretations because both agencies have 
expertise and are interpreting their governing statutes.315  Accordingly, 
Professor Weaver considers it appropriate to consider the agencies’ 
competing interpretations.316 
In another article, Professor Gersen cites Martin and argues that as 
between two agencies conflicting over an interpretation of their governing 
statute, “courts should presume that Congress delegated law-interpreting 
authority to the more expert agency rather than the less expert agency.”317  
In Martin, the Supreme Court reasoned that “[b]ecause historical familiarity 
and policymaking expertise account in the first instance for the presumption 
that Congress delegates interpretive lawmaking power to the agency rather 
than to the reviewing court,” the Court could presume that “Congress 
intended to invest interpretive power in the administrative actor in the best 
position to develop these attributes.”318 
Further supporting the importance of expertise, Professor Gersen cites 
the role it played in the Court’s opinion in Gonzales v. Oregon.319  In that 
case, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of expertise when it 
declined to defer to the DOJ’s interpretation on the ground that the Attorney 
General lacked the relevant expertise.320  The Court held that instead, the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services possessed the expertise to consider 
health and medical practices.321  However, Professor Gersen notes the 
shortcomings of expertise as “too static and exogenous,” since a 
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multiagency regulatory scheme would necessarily facilitate each agency 
developing its own expertise.322 
Professor Gersen further argues that when multiple agencies administer 
one statute, whether one agency’s view about the statute’s meaning receives 
deference under Chevron is best treated as a Step Zero inquiry.323  
According to Professor Gersen, although political accountability and 
expertise are no longer sufficient to support Chevron deference by 
themselves, they remain relevant in the Step Zero inquiry if the court 
determines that expertise or accountability constitute reasons that Congress 
would prefer deference to agencies.324 
Professor Gersen notes that courts regularly use the absence of expertise 
to justify not giving deference to agency views of shared jurisdiction 
statutes.325  At the same time, and especially in the overlapping jurisdiction 
context,326 when several agencies share responsibility for administering a 
statute, they all may have more expertise than the generalist courts.327  And 
despite having multiple agencies administer the same statute, these agencies 
generally will be more responsive to democratic accountability than a 
court.328 
In contrast, Professor Hammond takes a less favorable approach to 
expertise as a dispositive factor.329  Professor Hammond analyzes a 
particular kind of agency conflict—one where one agency claims superior 
authority via expertise and the other claims it via political accountability—
and determines that the deference question ought to hinge on the text of the 
statute and congressional intent.330  Professor Hammond argues that the 
judiciary’s focus on these two elements facilitate congressional control, 
while still recognizing the policymaking authority of the executive 
branch.331 
Professor Hammond cites to the very language that Professor Gersen 
cites above to argue that expertise is not a compelling factor because the 
Court engaged in a statutory analysis aimed at ascertaining Congress’s 
intent:  “[T]he statute governed the relationship between the agencies and 
their respective spheres of authority[, and] once that issue had been decided, 
ordinary judicial review was to proceed, with deference as warranted.”332 
Most recently, Professor Sharkey proposed a two-point strategy to issues 
stemming from shared regulatory space.333  The first is a balkanization 
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strategy, which constrains shared regulatory space by encouraging agencies 
to create “separate, non-overlapping spheres of authority.”334  The second 
strategy tasks courts with soliciting input from other relevant agencies when 
the courts confront an agency both operating in a shared regulatory space 
and offering its own interpretation within its delegated shared authority.335  
Professor Sharkey posits that “[c]ourts could easily . . . adopt a clear default 
rule in overlapping delegations to better facilitate agency coordination and 
exploit shared spaces to reach better policy outcomes” by soliciting absent 
agency views in determining deference.336 
III.   THREE STEPS FORWARD:  ADDING ONE MORE STEP TO CHEVRON 
Some scholarship and courts have recommended that in the context of 
overlapping regulatory schemes, Chevron should not apply;337 but that 
proposition should not be the entire standard. 
The D.C. Circuit divided the types of shared regulatory authority-
conferring statutes into three categories:  statutes of general applicability, 
statutes where a few specialized agencies have potentially overlapping 
authority, and statutes where specialized agencies have mutually exclusive 
authority.338  This division is helpful in determining when and how 
deference should be accorded.  The consensus regarding statutes of general 
applicability, like the APA and FOIA, should be followed because it seems 
correct that “the broadly sprawling applicability undermines any basis for 
deference.”339  Accordingly, courts should review all interpretative 
questions arising from conflicting interpretations of general statutes de 
novo.340 
However, for statutes like the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, where 
Congress tasked four agencies with enforcement,341 and statutes where 
expert enforcement agencies have mutually exclusive authority over 
separate sets of regulatory space, as outlined by the D.C. Circuit, courts 
should adhere to the Chevron doctrine.342  After all, 
[i]f regulatory decisions in the face of ambiguities amount in large part to 
choices of policy, and if Congress has delegated basic implementing 
authority to the agency, the Chevron approach might reflect a belief, 
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attributable to Congress in the absence of a clear contrary legislative 
statement, in the comparative advantages of the agency in making those 
choices.343 
In the same way that scholars have argued against courts supplanting their 
own interpretations for those of the agency, a court’s refusal to award 
Chevron deference or to consider the application of the persuasive Skidmore 
deference simply because more than one agency has interpretive authority 
undermines the deference doctrine and the idea that courts ought not replace 
reasonable agency interpretations with their own interpretations.344 
Moreover, Congress’s awareness of Chevron bolsters the position that 
the legislating body itself prefers that the agencies resolve ambiguities, not 
courts.345  Accordingly, to promote the principles outlined above, this Note 
proposes an additional step in the Chevron assessment that is applicable 
where two or more agencies have proffered reasonable interpretations of a 
statute that each administers or where two or more agencies have authority 
over the same policy space.  Part III.A presents this “Step Three” as a 
Skidmore-like analysis that asks the court to consider several factors as part 
of a balancing test.  Part III.B uses the hypothetical presented in the 
Introduction as an example of how the new step would work. 
A.   The Proposal:  Chevron Step Three 
As discussed earlier,346 Chevron and Mead provide a three-step inquiry 
to determine whether an agency may receive Chevron deference:  Step 
Zero, Step One, and Step Two.347  Consider again the hypothetical posed in 
the Introduction.348  Assume Congress has delegated to the FDA and USDA 
force of law authority to promulgate regulations in the same shared 
regulatory space, specifically over the safety of the use of bioengineered 
food in breeding cattle.  Further assume that each agency interprets the 
statute differently so that each interprets “safety” as it understands the term 
under its own regulations, and these interpretations directly conflict.  
Because ETSI and Martin do not preclude the award of deference to one of 
two agencies,349 a court confronting this situation would apply the current 
regime, which begins with Step Zero.350 
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Step Zero first asks whether Congress had delegated authority to the 
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law; in this 
hypothetical, Congress has.351  The second part of Step Zero asks whether 
the agency promulgated the regulation at issue in the exercise of that 
authority; here, the agency has.352  Because the court answered both Step 
Zero questions in the affirmative, the court moves to the Chevron two-step 
inquiry.353  Chevron Step One asks whether the statute is ambiguous in its 
delegation of authority to the agencies; here, the construction of the statute 
is ambiguous with respect to jurisdiction.354  Accordingly, the court moves 
to Step Two, which asks whether each agency’s interpretation is a 
permissible reading of the statute; in this hypothetical, both agencies have 
proffered permissible interpretations.355 
The court has determined that both agencies have met the Chevron tests, 
but the court cannot award deference to both since their interpretations 
conflict.  It is at this point that the court should employ a third step to 
determine to which agency it ought to defer.  Step Three comprises of a six-
factor balancing test; and these factors reflect the considerations and canons 
of construction underlying Chevron and Skidmore. 
The factors are as follows: 
1.  Agency Expertise.  The Chevron standard values agency expertise and 
relies on it as a factor,356 as does the Skidmore standard, which includes 
the experience of agencies as guidance.357  Moreover, scholars point to 
the comparative competence between the generalist court and specialized 
agency in advocating for a presumption of deference.358  Accordingly, it 
is reasonable for a court to consider the respective expertise of each 
agency in the regulatory space over which the agencies claim 
authority.359  On balance, whether an agency has accumulated a particular 
expertise and whether the agency relies on that expertise to carry out the 
provision at issue can provide a reviewing court one way to distinguish 
between two agencies and their reasonable interpretations. 
2.  Congressional Intent and Legislative History.  Although not all 
legislative history is reliable,360 there are some types of legislative history 
that are highly reliable because they represent an “integral part of the 
shared understanding reached by Congress as a whole.”361  These types 
of legislative history include (1) instances where one or both houses of 
Congress base their decisions for amending or changing a legislative 
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action on statements made in committee reports;362 (2) the report 
language of the relevant committees that Congress understands as the 
“controlling guidance on a textual provision;”363 and (3) explanatory 
statements that comprise all interested legislative opinions when viewed 
objectively.364  And as Professor Hammond notes, the history was 
relevant to the determination in Martin and helps to ascertain the true 
intent of Congress.365  Courts should further consider the general purpose 
of Congress in enacting the statute and the evil the statute was meant to 
remedy in assessing whether one agency appears to merit deference.  To 
the extent they provide explicit guidance for a court, the intent, as gleaned 
from the legislative history, provides a second important element to 
consider in resolving the issue of deference where there is interagency 
conflict. 
3.  The History of the Statute and the History of the Agency’s 
Authority.  The history of the statute, its body of amendments and 
revisions, is an important consideration for courts to determine the true 
intent of Congress—especially where a subsequent piece of legislation 
transfers authority from one agency to another.366  If Congress transfers 
authority from one agency to another or expands the authority of an 
agency, that intent takes precedent over the more outdated legislation.367  
In these ways, a court can determine from these considerations an element 
of congressional intent to vest certain powers in certain agencies, and as 
such, this factor provides a third reasonable element for courts. 
4.  Political Accountability.  Chevron values the democratic system and 
notes that unlike the judiciary, agencies are politically accountable, at 
least indirectly through the President.368  And also similarly, in arguing 
for a presumption favoring deference, scholars point to the political 
accountability of agencies over the judiciary.369  However, the question 
of political accountability is more nuanced when the choices are between 
two agencies:  where the court is determining whether to defer to an 
executive agency or to an independent agency, there may be 
accountability considerations.370  The traditional understanding is that 
executive agencies are more directly accountable, however, recent 
scholarship indicates that independent agencies are directly accountable to 
a constituency.371  Because the determination is case-specific and certain 
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agencies are more independent (or accountable) than others,372 this factor 
is helpful to courts considering the question of deference. 
5.  Whether the Executive Branch Has Weighed in on the Matter.  
Related to the previous factor on political accountability, this factor 
considers whether the executive branch, either through the President, the 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) of the Department of Justice, or the White 
House’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) have 
weighed in on the matter.  Though this speaks to the Executive’s will and 
not the will of Congress, whether and how the Executive has weighed in 
should be a consideration because it implicates notions of democratic 
accountability.373  Whether it be through executive orders, other 
executive announcements,374 OIRA,375 the Solicitor General,376 or 
OLC,377 the Executive addressing or weighing in on the matter is 
important information for the judiciary to consider.  A significant part of 
the missions of OIRA and OLC is to resolve conflicts between 
agencies,378 and in particular, OIRA’s role is more about coordination 
between agencies rather than cost-benefit analysis.  In this way, a court 
may look at the role of the Executive in balancing the factors for 
deference. 
6.  Thoroughness of Consideration.  Rooted in the Skidmore opinion, a 
court may consider the process by which the competing agencies came to 
their interpretations.379  Courts generally have favored processes that 
permit and incorporate public comment, like notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.  When confronted with one agency that promulgated 
regulations without notice and another that undertook a meaningful notice 
and comment period,380 the court may find deference applicable to the 
latter agency.  The consideration of Skidmore factors, both here in factor 
six and above in factor three, in a third Chevron step resonates with the 
scholarship arguing that Skidmore is an implicit consideration in Step 
One.381 
Where two agencies, both authorized by the same statute to have 
nonexclusive and incomplete jurisdiction over some policy space, have 
interpreted a statutory ambiguity in different ways, Step Three will resolve 
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the conflict.  That the statute authorizes both agencies to have enforcement 
power meets the Step Zero threshold.  That the statute contains 
ambiguities—assuming no other provision of the statute precludes one or 
both of the agencies from exercising authority—meets Step One.  And 
assuming that both interpretations are reasonable, meeting Step Two, the 
court is left with two interpretations that could be awarded Chevron 
deference.  Step Three provides a framework for courts to use to determine 
to which agency to defer. 
As Justice Stevens’s opinion in Chevron notes, by passing ambiguous 
statutes, Congress has explicitly or implicitly delegated power to 
administrative agencies to fill in the gaps of the statute.382  This suggests 
that courts should defer to an agency because of the ambiguity.383  Step 
Three is consistent with and seeks to further this argument by encouraging 
courts to use the relevant principles and policies to balance and determine 
which agency should be filling in those gaps. 
As a temporal matter, it is preferable that this balancing test be a third 
step rather than at the initial phase because, to the extent that any one or all 
of the agencies do not pass through either of the well-established Chevron 
steps,384 the court need not consider the Step Three factors at all.  Because 
engaging in a standards test, such as the one proposed, requires the court to 
balance several factors, it would be in the interest of judicial economy if a 
court could resolve the conflict at any of those threshold marks. 
Professor Sunstein’s remarks about Chevron carry the same force with 
respect to the proposed Step Three; just like Chevron, the Step Three 
assessment should not be “a mechanical exercise of uncovering an actual 
legislative decision,” but one which “calls for a frankly value-laden 
judgment about comparative competence, undertaken in light of the 
regulatory structure and applicable constitutional considerations.”385 
B.   Step Three at Work 
Returning to the hypothetical posed in the Introduction,386 Step Three 
would allow a court to resolve the dispute.  The Introduction presented a 
piece of legislation aimed at ensuring the safety of bioengineered food fed 
to cattle, as well as a subsequent conflict between the FDA and the USDA 
over the interpretation of the word “safety” as used in their authorizing 
statute.  Using Step Three, a court could balance the facts and factors to 
determine that the USDA should receive deference. 
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Considering (1) agency expertise, though both the FDA and USDA have 
their particularized expertise—the FDA having oversight over food safety 
standards for almost all food products and the USDA having oversight over 
the food safety standards related to, among other things, meat—a court 
reviewing the scope of each agency’s jurisdiction would determine that the 
USDA has honed a more specialized expertise in the safety of meat 
products over the FDA.  Moreover, the court would look at the fact that the 
USDA had been honing this expertise for over fifty years before the FDA 
even received authority in the same general regulatory space.  In so doing, 
the court would find that, on balance, expertise favored the USDA. 
Examining (2) congressional intent and legislative history, the court may 
determine that Congress wanted the FDA to take control of this regulatory 
space because the 1958 statute came later in time, reflecting a new intent on 
the part of Congress to vest the FDA with this power.  The court would 
undertake a review of the legislative history to see whether the 
congressional members discussed the topic of transferring authority and 
would consider the results of that search.  Here, the hypothetical does not 
note any legislative history. 
Reviewing (3) the history of the statute and the history of the agency 
authority, the court may determine that on balance, both agencies have 
claims to deference.  For substantially the same reasons articulated in 
assessing factor (2), the court could find that the history of the agency 
authority tended to support a new direction by Congress, finding the FDA 
prevailed in this factor.  On the other hand, the court could view the history 
of the statute, again paying particular focus to the number of years that the 
USDA had been overseeing this policy space, and determine that on 
balance, the USDA was the agency Congress intended to regulate the policy 
space. 
Considering (4) political accountability, the court would initially note 
that both agencies are executive agencies but would ultimately determine 
that the USDA is the more politically accountable agency.  Historically, the 
FDA has enjoyed practical independence from presidential influence (as 
well as other political and interest group pressure) because of its effective 
role as a watchdog agency,387 whereas the USDA enjoys very little 
independence.388 
Reaching (5) whether the executive branch has weighed in on the matter, 
the hypothetical is silent on the role of the executive branch, and 
accordingly, the court would not consider the factor in its analysis.  Because 
a balancing test is a value determination rather than a threshold inquiry, the 
absence of one factor or information allowing the consideration of one 
factor does not negate the utility of the balancing test. 
And finally, examining (6) the thoroughness of the consideration, the 
court would review the scientific thoroughness of the USDA’s methods in 
reaching its interpretation of safety against the means by which the FDA 
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reached its interpretation of safety.  Although the FDA’s interpretation is 
more stringent, if the court determines that the USDA’s methods were more 
thorough, the court would ultimately find that the USDA was the agency 
meant to regulate the policy space. 
Having walked through each factor, the court would see that the majority 
of the factors, and the weight of those factors as compared to the weight of 
factors urging for the FDA, compel the conclusion that the USDA is the 
agency to which the court owes deference.  This hypothetical presents a 
simple set of facts that lend themselves to a resolution of the conflict via 
Step Three. 
CONCLUSION 
Chevron provides the framework for a court considering whether to 
award deference to a single agency’s interpretation of its authorizing 
statute, but because Congress increasingly enacts multiagency statutes, 
courts increasingly confront both interagency conflicts and deference 
problems arising from the very existence of shared regulatory space.  In 
reviewing these conflicts and problems, courts have employed a variety of 
rationales, and usually have declined to award any deference.  
This Note argues that multiagency statutes do not preclude agency 
deference and that courts should undertake a modified Chevron analysis to 
determine deference.  The goal of this Note is to afford similar deference 
principles to agencies authorized under multiagency schemes as those 
agencies authorized under single-agency schemes.  The application of 
Chevron deference should not turn on how many agencies Congress 
authorizes to regulate a particular policy space but rather on the principles 
that the Supreme Court has articulated through the years in awarding 
deference to agencies.  A balancing test that considers these principles 
preserves the separation of powers between the judiciary and the agencies, 
promotes uniformity in a national administrative regime, and fosters 
internal coherence within the law. 
